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Abstract:
The dynamic relationship between hypernorms and microsocial contracts can explain
novel, evolutionary changes in economic life. The conceptual machinery of Integrative Social
Contracts Theory (ISCT) can be expanded in order to understand dynamic moments in the
evolution in economic life such as the economic crisis of 2008-09. When a transition of the
ethical interpretation of economic events occurs over time, it can be understood as a transition
from the opaqueness of hypernorms to the relative clarity of microsocial contracts. This
phenomenon deserves more study than it has received, and entails, at a minimum, the application
of an enhanced, more dynamic interpretation of ISCT.
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Compass and dead reckoning: the dynamic implications of ISCT
Tom Dunfee and I enjoyed debating issues with significance for ISCT. One of our
favorites was whether hypernorms could evolve over time. He argued that they could; I
disagreed. We never resolved the issue. But we always agreed that that moral knowledge
evolves over time, especially in the form of changing microsocial contracts.
In this paper I want to extend the thread of that concept. I want to show how the
interplay of hypernorms and microsocial contracts can explain novel, evolutionary changes in
economic life. The conceptual machinery of Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT)
(Donaldson and Dunfee) can be expanded in order to understand dynamic moments in the
evolution in economic life such as the economic crisis of 2008-09. When a transition of the
ethical interpretation of economic events by market participants occurs over time, it can be
understood as a transition from the opaqueness of hypernorms to the relative clarity of
microsocial contracts. This phenomenon deserves more study than it has received, and entails, at
a minimum, the application of an enhanced, more dynamic interpretation of ISCT.
First, it is worth reminding ourselves of ISCT’s basic conceptual machinery. ISCT is a
theory founded upon two kinds of contract, namely, “macrosocial” and “microsocial.” The
former, the macrosocial, is a hypothetical agreement about a broad normative framework
designed to guide all economic arrangements; the latter are norms created by “economic
communities,” i.e., self-determined groups who carry on economic activity, that reflect
agreement attitudes and behaviors of most members of a community. Microsocial contracts
make up the ethical rules of the economic game from the vantage point of communities of
players. They represent a general consensus among community members about economic rules
3
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and propriety, and may or may not be reflected in black-letter or formal rules, such as laws or
codes of conduct. Important for our purposes is that microsocial contracts can include both
unwritten agreements and agreed-upon procedures that have grown slowly within an industry or
other economic unit to handle a specific problem. (Donaldson and Dunfee Chapters 2-4)
Clues to a dynamic interpretation of ISCT can be discovered in non-economic contexts.
Modern medicine stands out as an example. It is worth reflecting on the way in which modern
medicine exhibits a recurring pattern over time: new medical technologies create ethical
confusion, only later for the confusion to be abated as society develops new ethical precepts and
practices. Consider: during the twentieth century, medical science became increasingly adept at
extending human life beyond traditional limits. The invention of feeding tubes, respirators,
bottled oxygen, and kidney dialysis extended the lives of patients who before would have died
quickly. This new technology meant not only that patients lived longer, but sometimes did so
with many normal abilities impaired or destroyed. Old practices thus confronted new realities.
A patient with a terminal illness who had already lost the ability to talk, to focus visually, and to
chew food could now be kept alive with an invasive respirator and feeding tube. But this same
patient might have abhorred the prospect of such a fate, and may even have earlier shared his
abhorrence with friends and family. Hence family members, patients and doctors found
themselves facing the implications of new technology de novo; as they first groped their way
through these new challenges, they understandably resorted to broad, normative principles about
managing medical care such as found in the Hippocratic Oath (Hippocrates). They cited
hypernorms such as the “benefit and do no harm” precept from the Hippocratic Oath: i.e., “I will
follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the
benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous.”(Records)
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Other broad moral norms such as the right of family members to choose for other members
mentally impaired, the norm of individual autonomy, and the sanctity of human life were also
invoked, sometimes with contradictory implications.
By the close of the Twentieth Century, however, more specific principles and
practices eclipsed generic ones. Debates still raged, but they did so over narrower and narrower
matters. It is worth asking what precisely happened in this evolution of moral understanding
about death and dying. The answer is that detailed processes and agreements came to be
substituted for generic hypernorms. Chief among them was the right of people to adopt ex ante
“living wills,” documents that specified more precisely what an individual wanted at the end of
his life. What is more, the institutionalization of hospital ethics committees, new, agreed-upon
definitions of “death” that depended more on brain activity and less on physical respiration, and
finally systems of “code” designations for critically ill patients played important roles. Even the
Hippocratic Oath was revised. In place of the simple “benefit and don’t harm” provision,
modern versions tend to underscore the complexity of the dying process. One widely-used and
more modern version of the Hippocratic Oath reads: “Most especially must I [the physician]
tread with care in matters of life and death. If it is given me to save a life, all thanks. But it may
also be within my power to take a life; this awesome responsibility must be faced with great
humbleness and awareness of my own frailty.” (Hippocrates)
This ethical evolution spawned by the advent of new technology has occurred frequently
in medicine and biology. Inventions such as in vitro fertilization, animal cloning, and most
recently the use of stem cells in research, all provoked moral confusion at the outset, only later to
give way to the development of specific principles and practices. We confront novelty at first
with the only conceptual tools that we possess, ones that are shaped to fit almost any dilemma.
5
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These are hypernorms. Later, we reach agreements about specifics. These are microsocial
contracts.
The pattern of confronting technological novelty with hypernorms, then later designing
and implementing microsocial contracts, extends beyond bioethics. Consider another example:
the ethics of war. The development of submarine warfare, aerial bombing, and weapons of mass
destruction all provoked moral confusion at their inception. When poison gas was first used
widely in WWI, few limits could be either imagined or specified. The debate at the time
centered around traditional hypernorms from the “Jus ad Bellum” or “Just War” theory
developed in the Middle Ages. Again, we confronted the challenge at first with the only tools
that were handy, i.e., hypernorms. Enhancing ethical precision takes time. Such precision in the
instance of poison gas awaited the the development of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the
subsequent Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, agreements in which poison gas is both
banned in certain instances and also regulated.
Some technological inventions take even longer. We still lack significant microsocial
contracts for regulating aerial bombing. The hypernorm principle from the Jus ad Bellum
tradition declaring “noncombatant immunity” is now employed by different sides both to justify
and to condemn forms of aerial attack. Consider the 2009 conflict between Gaza and Israel.
Israel argued that in contrast to Hamas, its actions respected the principle of non-combatant
immunity. It used “smart” munitions and always chose military targets, in contrast to Hamas,
who used homemade rockets incapable of distinguishing military targets from non-combatants.
Ironically, however, Hamas used the same generic principle of non-combatant immunity to
condemn Israel. When Israel used aerial bombing and rocket strikes, Hamas noted, Israel clearly
foresaw that many non-combatants would be killed. By January 30 of 2009, Gaza health
6
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officials said that the overall Palestinian death toll had passed 1,200, with women and children
making up about 40 percent of the dead. The Israeli death toll on the same day reached 13,
including ten soldiers and three civilians. So who, Gazan officials asked, was respecting the
principle of non-combatant immunity? Until participants in wars move beyond the generic
hypernorms such as “non-combatant immunity” to more precise agreements and principles, i.e.,
some form of microsocial contracts, there can be no further clarification of the issue at hand.
Ethical clarity in the wake of technological change thus involves a transition from general
to specific, from hypernorms to microsocial contracts. The analogues in economic life are easy
to spot:
Example #1: Highly-leveraged derivatives:
Banks in the US and UK, such as Bankers Trust Co. and Goldman Sachs, pioneered in
the late 1980s a new, powerful financial tool called “derivatives.” So-named because they
“derive” their value from an underlying asset such as currency, bonds, or commodities,
derivatives are often useful in managing risk. Derivatives purchased by a gold mining company
can soften the company’s exposure to wildly fluctuating gold prices. In turn the mining
company can focus on what it knows how to do best, i.e., mine gold efficiently, instead of
subordinating operations to predictions of future swings in the price of gold.
Derivatives are not biological technology such as birth control pills or in vitro
fertilization, yet may be seen as a form of economic technology. They are often structured in
complex ways that make the extent of the risks and the rewards opaque to all but the most
sophisticated financial minds.
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While derivatives manage risk, they can also enhance it. Because any derivative is
essentially a bet about the future, derivative products can become bets gone bad. The problem is
exacerbated when the bets are “highly-leveraged” and also when used not to manage risk but to
earn money for a company on the side, i.e., outside its normal operations. In the late 1980s and
early 1990s, a few corporate treasurers and even the public treasurer of Orange County,
California, Robert Citron, made bets with derivatives that lost their organizations hundreds of
millions of dollars. Orange County alone lost more than $1.6 billion and was forced to declare
bankruptcy. (Pollack) Gibson Greeting Cards, Inc., and Proctor & Gamble, Inc., both sued
Bankers Trust Company after derivatives the companies had purchased from Bankers Trust lost
tens of millions of dollars in the early 1990s. The companies claimed that they had not properly
been informed of the risk associated with the derivatives sold by Bankers Trust. Even the
slightest swing in, say, bond price, can turn a highly-leveraged derivative into what Warren
Buffett famously called a “financial weapon of mass destruction.” (Buffett 15)
As banks and their customers grappled with the fallout from this new, financial
technology, they could be seen following the same temporal pattern seen in other spheres: a
move from hypernorms to microsocial contracts. They first attempted to apply the time-tested
principles of investor protection: namely, “suitability” and “appropriateness.” A risky stock sold
to a pensioner on a fixed income might fail both precepts, and regulations in the security industry
commonly invoked such concepts. But the new instruments were also starkly different from
ordinary brokerage products. They were typically sold to very sophisticated counterparties
(corporate treasurers usually possessed advanced degrees in finance), and information about
what was or was not “suitable” for a company was so strongly linked to the company’s closelyheld business strategy that third parties, including banks, were in a poor position to evaluate it.
8
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During this period, the word “derivative” acquired a distinctly immoral connotation for some. A
joke circulating at the time had it that the word, “derivative,” and the word, “devil,” both begin
with the same letter.
As time passed, however, new procedures and concepts began to infiltrate the derivatives
business. Even today the sale of derivatives is not heavily regulated by the government, but
companies and customers have devised new techniques to come to grips with the risks
derivatives pose. So –called “sensitivity analysis,” mathematical techniques that attempt to
reflect and make transparent the underlying risks of derivatives have become increasingly
sophisticated and accurate, leading to greater confidence on both sides of the transaction.
Internal policies at banks and bank customer companies have also evolved to limit risk. Today,
banks reward employees who sell derivatives in more complex ways than simply “marking-tomarket” the net present value of the derivative; and bank customers utilize norms that restrict
treasurers from making hidden bets that will damage the company. Derivatives can still be
“weapons of financial mass destruction” but they do not evoke the same black and white moral
controversies of the 1990s. Our ethical treatment of derivatives has become increasingly
sophisticated. It is noteworthy that the microsocial contracts that now surround them are mostly
informal, in contrast to government statutes or regulatory norms.
Example #2: Securitization in the Economic Crisis of 2008.
The economic crisis unfolding at the time of this writing, 2009, bears all the earmarks of
earlier clashes of new technology with general norms. This time the new technology involves
among other things the so-called “securitization” of debt, a novel, ingenious financial technique
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to allow routine financial obligations such as mortgages, credit card debt, and auto debt, to be
repackaged into bulk units that are then sold as securities in a broader market.
This new form of financial alchemy took pools of mortgages or credit-card loans and
bundled them for sale to investors around the world. The bundle was sliced into different
tranches, each of which carried a different level of creditworthiness. The top tranches were the
first to be paid, and thus they held higher ratings than the lower ones. But the bundled products
were notoriously hard to value, and this was true even before the limited markets for the products
nearly vanished in 2008. Methods of valuation for these highly sophisticated securities varied
depending on the firm; there was no uniformity and hence no agreed-upon price. To make
matters worse, these securitized products sold only rarely, making their market value opaque.
(Nocera)
To illustrate the complexity and opaqueness of the financial technology of securitization,
consider a single example discussed by Bajaj and Labaton: a security that in 2009 was trading at
38 cents on the dollar. The bond was backed by 9,000 second mortgages from borrowers who
put down little or no money to buy their homes. Nearly a quarter of the loans were delinquent,
and losses on the defaulted mortgages were averaging 40 percent. But, remarkably, this same
security once had a top rating, i.e., triple-A.(Bajaj and Labaton) Of course we all know now that
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s botched their analyses of such securitized mortgages, but few if
anyone could have anticipated that the price of a security backed by home mortgages could fall
sixty percent within a year or two. (Lewis and Einhorn)
As economies around the world reeled in reaction to the financial explosions set off by
the securitization whirlwind, moral criticism followed traditional, hypernorm-guided patterns.
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Simple greed caused the problem, pundits and editorialists shouted. And simple lack of selfcontrol by home buyers who stretched beyond their means to commit to mortgages aggravated
the bankers’ greed.
But while no doubt greed played a role in the crisis, it has been a powerful influence in
business in every period in every age. There is little new about greed. The first decade of the
twenty-first century may have witnessed a sudden spike of greed (although it is hard to know
how such a spike could be proven), but it also saw the age-old motive acquire a remarkable new
tool: the securitized investment loan.
No one can reliably predict the outcome of the 2008 economic crisis, but the manner in
which society’s ethical attitudes towards securitized loans evolve is likely to be similar to the
way its attitudes towards ethical issues sparked by other novel technology. In short, we will over
time substitute more tailored norms and practices in place of simple moral dictums such as
“avoid greed” and “don’t take out loans you can’t pay off.” Already in 2009 a series of
suggestions for new norms and practices had been made inside and outside the banking industry.
In addition to higher capital requirements for banks and more direct regulation, they included
industry norms requiring that issuing banks maintain a significant position, say, twenty percent,
of the securitized products they market to others. Still more, Treasury Secretary Bernanke and
others pushed for a new “awareness” among banking executives about the quality of loans and
the due diligence that preceded loans, including those made to hedge funds.(Bernanke) One can
predict that once more hypernorms will give way over time to microsocial contracts tailored to
the precise ethical challenges of securitized loans.
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Interpreting ISCT dynamically in this manner is a reflection of how specific problems
require specific approaches, and that until we discover them we use general approaches.
Consider the analogy of flying. Sometimes a pilot can know by GPS or visual memory his exact
location and where he must guide his plane. Other times he must proceed by compass and dead
reckoning, i.e., the process of estimating ones current position by utilizing a previously known
position and then advancing that position based on known speed, elapsed time, and course. When
new economic technology, whether highly-leveraged derivatives, SIVs (special investment
vehicles), off-book entities such as the infamous “raptors” used by Enron, credit default swaps,
or CDOs (Collateralized Debt Obligations), is introduced we first resort in the only way possible:
to our moral compass and a process of dead reckoning. Later, we develop more precise means
of guidance.
Interpreting ISCT dynamically in this manner is compatible with even conflicting views
about the way in which moral knowledge is said to evolve. One view is that morality is silent
with regard to new situations such that new norms need to be developed in order to provide
guidance. Another possibility is that persons gain a better understanding of what morality
requires in situations not previously encountered. The former is like a process of construction;
the latter is more like a process of discovery. We do not need to decide whether the development
of microsocial contracts that solve new economic challenges involve, at least partly, a deepening
of our understanding of hypernorms, i.e., a process of discovery in order to note that the
evolution of the process creates a solution set of understandings, rules, and procedures, i.e.,
microsocial contracts.1

1

I am indebted to my colleague, Nien-he Hsieh, for drawing my attention to this issue.
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To conclude, we have seen how issues of ISCT can be understood in a dynamic and not
merely static context, a context that sheds light on the way in which novel innovations in
economic activity challenge existing ethical conceptions and, in turn, force the search for new
interpretations. What is becoming increasingly obvious, and merits more attention, is how new
economic technology spawns a dynamic pattern of hypernorm interpretation followed by the
creation of new microsocial contracts. When such a transition in ethical interpretation occurs
over time, it can be understood as a transition from the opaqueness of hypernorms to the relative
clarity of microsocial contracts. It is interesting to speculate about whether patterns can be
discerned for successful vs. unsuccessful evolution to microsocial norms.
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